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Network Slicing Games: Enabling Customization
in Multi-Tenant Mobile Networks
Pablo Cabalero , Albert Banchs , Senior Member, IEEE, Gustavo De Veciana , Felow, IEEE,
and Xavier Costa-Pérez, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract— Network slicing to enable resource sharing among
multiple tenants–network operators and/or services–is considered
as a key functionality for next generation mobile networks.
This paper provides an analysis of a wel-known model for
resource sharing, the share-constrained proportional alocation
mechanism, to realize network slicing. This mechanism enables
tenants to reap the performance beneﬁts of sharing, while
retaining the ability to customize their own users’ alocation. This
results in anetwork slicing gamein which each tenant reacts to
the user alocations of the other tenants so as to maximize its
own utility. We show that, for elastic trafﬁc, the game associated
with such strategic behavior converges to a Nash equilibrium.
At the Nash equilibrium, a tenant always achieves the same or
better performance than that of a static partitioning of resources,
thus providing the same level of protection as static partitioning.
We further analyze the efﬁciency and fairness of the resulting
alocations, providing tight bounds for the price of anarchy
and envy-freeness. Our analysis and extensive simulation results
conﬁrm that the mechanism provides a comprehensive practical
solution to realize network slicing. Our theoretical results also
ﬁls a gap in the analysis of this resource alocation model under
strategic players.
Index Terms— Wireless networks, 5G, network slicing, game
theory, resource alocation, multi-tenant networks.
I. INTRODUCTIONTHERE is consensus among the relevant industry andstandardization communities [1], [2] that a key element
in 5G mobile networks wil be network slicing. The idea is 
to alow the mobile infrastructure to be “sliced” into logical
networks, which are operated by diferent entities and may be 
tailored to support speciﬁc services. This provides a basis for
efﬁcient infrastructure sharing among diverse entities, ranging
from classical or virtual mobile network operators to new
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players that simply view connectivity as a service. Such new
players could be, for instance, Over-The-Top (OTT) service
providers which use anetwork sliceto ensure satisfactory
service to their customers (e.g., Amazon Kindle’s support
for downloading content or a pay TV channel including a
premium subscription). In the literature, the termtenantis
often used to refer to the owner of a network slice.
A network slice is a colection of resources and func-
tions that are orchestrated to support a speciﬁc service. This
includes software modules running at diferent locations as
wel as the nodes’ computational resources, and communi-
cation resources in the backhaul and radio network. The
intention is to only provide what is necessary for the service,
avoiding unnecessary overheads and complexity. Thus, net-
work slices enable tenants to compete with each other using
the same physical infrastructure, but customizing their slices
and network operation according to their market segment’s
characteristics and requirements. For instance, slices can be
geared at supporting various IoT or M2M applications, such
as the connectivity required to realize ‘inteligent’ vehicular
systems.
A key problem underlying network slicing is enabling
efﬁcient sharing of mobile network resources. One of the
frameworks considered in 3GPP suggests that resources could
be staticaly partitioned based on ﬁxed ‘network shares’ asso-
ciated to each slice [3]. This framework ﬁts very wel some
scenarios like, e.g., the case where several operators jointly
contribute to a common infrastructure with a fraction of the
overal cost and share this infrastructure with the others while
being entitled to use an amountof resources that depends
on their monetary contribution. For other network slicing
scenarios, such as the case where some tenants only need to
use a ﬁxed amount of network resources for some limited
period of time, other frameworks considered in the standards
may be more appropriate.
The focus of this paper is on network slicing for the share-
based framework mentioned above. However, given that slices’
loads may be spatialy inhomogenous and time varying, rather
than staticaly partitioning the resources at each base station,
it is deemed desirable to alow resource alocations to be
dependent on the slices’ loads at diferent base stations. At the
same time, tenants should be protected from one another,
and retain the ability to autonomously manage their slice’s
resources, in order to beter customize alocations to their cus-
tomers. To that end, it is desirable to adopt resource alocation
models in which tenants can communicate their preferences
to the infrastructure (say by dynamicaly subdividing their
network share amongst their customers) and then have base 
stations’ resources alocated according to their preferences 
(e.g., proportionaly to the customers’ shares).
Under such a dynamic resource alocation model, a tenant 
might exhibit strategic behavior, by adjusting its preferences 
depending on perceived congestion at resources, so as to max-
imize its own utility. Such behavior could in turn have adverse 
efects on the network; for instance, the overal efﬁciency may 
be harmed, or one may see instability in slice requests. The 
focus of this paper is on (i) the analysis and performance of 
this simple resource alocation model, and (ii) the validation 
of its feasibility as a means to enable tenants to customize 
resource alocation within their slice while protecting them 
from one another. The analysis of this paper concentrates on 
elastic trafﬁc; the case of inelastic trafﬁc has been addressed 
in [4].
Related Work
The resource alocation mechanism informaly described 
above, aligned with the ﬁxed ‘network shares’ model con-
sidered in 3GPP, corresponds to a Fisher market. This is a 
standard framework in economics; in such markets, buyers 
(in our case slices) have ﬁxed budgets (in our case network 
shares) and (according to their preferences) bid for resources 
within their budget, which are then alocated to buyers propor-
tionaly to their bids. Analysis of the Fisher market shows that, 
as long as buyers are price-taking (i.e., they do not anticipate 
the impact of their bids on the price – in our case, the impact 
of the slices’ preferences on the overal congestion), the Nash 
equilibrium is socialy optimal, and distributed algorithms can 
be easily devised to reach it [5]. This assumption may be 
reasonable for markets where the impact of a single buyer 
on a resource’s price is negligible, but does not apply to our 
case where a relatively smal number of active tenants might 
be sharing resources.
There is a substantial literature on Fisher markets with 
strategic buyers, which, as wil be studied in this paper, 
anticipate the impact of their bids [6]. The analysis, so far, has 
been limited to the case of buyers with linear utility functions 
of the alocated resources, which can lead to extremely unfair 
alocations. While such utility functions may be suitable for 
goods, they are not an appropriate model for tenants wishing 
to customize alocations amongst their customers. This paper 
includes a comprehensive analysis for a wide set of slice 
utility functions, including the convergence of best response 
dynamics and other results which to our knowledge are new.
A related resource alocation model often considered in the 
networking ﬁeld is the so-caled ‘Kely’s mechanism’ [7]; this 
mechanism alocates resources to players proportionaly to 
their bids and, assuming that they are price-taking, converges 
to a social optimum. Folow-up work has considered price-
anticipating players in this seting; for example, [8] ana-
lyze efﬁciency losses, while [9] devise a scalar-parametrized 
modiﬁcation that is once again socialy optimal for price-
anticipating players. However, in Kely’s mechanism players 
respond to their payof (given by the utility minus cost) 
whereas in our model tenants’ behavior is only driven by their
TABLE I
RESOURCEALLOCATIONMODELS
utilities (since they have a ﬁxed budget: the network share).
Consequently, results on the analysis of Kely’s mechanism
are not applicable to our seting
In the context of the existing resource alocation models
described above, this paper addresses the folowing gap in the
literature: the analysis ofbudget-constrained resource alo-
cationunderprice-anticipating userswithnonlinear utilities.
This requires novel analysis that difers substantialy from
previous work in the literature. Table I summarizes some of the
main resource alocation models for this problem, highlighting
the most relevant contributions for each case and situating the
contribution of this work.
Al the analyses mentioned above, as wel as that conducted
in this paper, consider concave utility functions, which reﬂects
the behavior of elastic trafﬁc [11]. In contrast to elastic appli-
cations, inelastic applications typicaly require a minimum
amount of resources to provide an acceptable experience to the
users, and their performance degrades drasticaly if resources
fal below this minimum. The case of inelastic trafﬁc has been
addressed by [4], leading to quite diferent outcomes; indeed,
in contrast to the results obtained in this paper, for inelastic
trafﬁc the existence of a Nash Equilibrium is not guaranteed,
best response dynamics may not converge and the Price of
Anarchy is not bounded.
Beyond the Fisher market model, there have been a number
of works in the literature that address game theory andα-
fairness, as we do in this paper. The work in [12] analyzes
the game resulting from alowing users to select the access
network, when resources in each network are alocated based
onα-fairness; in contrast, our game is played by selecting the
bid submited by each tenant, rather than the access network.
In [13], the authors prove the convergence of games where
individual user choices are driven by a convex optimization
(as in our case); however, they require some properties not met
by our game. The analysis of [14] shows the convergence of
a game with some similarities to ours, building on potential
game theory which cannot be applied in our case. In [15],
a number of methodologies are proposed to analyze equilibria
in wireless games, yet none of those games coincides with
ours. To the best of our knowledge, even though there is a vast
literature addressing equilibria and convergence of wireless
games, none of the existing tools can be applied to the speciﬁc
problem addressed here.
In order to design algorithms that converge to a Nash Equi-
librium, some work in the literature has proposed leveraging
reinforcement learning techniques [16]–[20]. A key advan-
tages of such approaches is that they do not require al the
knowledge involved in computing the best response. However,
while this is an essential feature for the systems addressed
by those papers, where best response requires substantial
information, in our system the best response requires only
limited information, and hence a practical approach can be
built based on best responses without having to resort to
reinforcement learning.
From a more practical perspective, multi-tenant sharing
has been studied from diferent points of view, including
planning, economics, coverage, performance, etc. [21], [22].
This paper focuses speciﬁcaly on the design of algorithms for
resource sharing among tenants, which has been previously
addressed by [23]–[26]. The work of [26] considers sharing
via a bid-based auction, which may incur substantial overhead
and complexity; in contrast, our approach relies on ﬁxed (pre-
negotiated) network shares. The works of [23]–[25] also ﬁx
a network share per slice, but consider approaches where the
infrastructure makes centralized decisions on the resources
alocated to each tenant’s customers; hence, these approaches
do not enable tenants to make their own decisions on how to
alocate resources to their customers.
Network slicing has emerged as a desirable feature for
5G [1]. 3GPP has started work on deﬁning requirements
for network slicing [2], whereas the Next Generation Mobile
Network (NGMN) aliance has identiﬁed network sharing
among slices (the focus of this paper) as a key issue [27].
In spite of these eforts, most of the work so far has addressed
architectural aspects with only a limited focus on resource
alocation algorithms [28], [29]. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the ﬁrst work investigating how to enable tenants
to customize their alocations in a dynamic slicing model;
there is wide consensus that such an ability to custumize
tenants’ alocations is needed to efﬁciently satisfy their very
diverse requirements (see, e.g., [30] for examples of vertical
tenants).
Key Contributions
The rest of the paper is organized as folows. After intro-
ducing our system model (Section II), we show that with
the resource sharing model under study, each slice has the
ability to achieve the same or beter utility than under static
resource slicing irrespective of how the other slices behave,
which conﬁrms that this model efectively protects slices from
one another (Section IV-A). Next we show that if tenants
exhibit strategic behavior (i.e, optimize their utilities), then
(i) a Nash equilibrium exists under mild conditions; and
(ii) the system converges to such an equilibrium when tenants
sequentialy take their best response (Sections III-B and III-C).
The resulting efﬁciency and fairness among tenants are then
studied, providing: (i) a tight bound on the Price of Anarchy of
the system, and (ii) a bound on the Envy-freeness (Section IV).
Our results are validated via simulation, conﬁrming that the
approach provides substantial gains, protects network slices
from each other, operates closeto optimal performance and is
efectively envy-free (Section V).
II. SYSTEMMODEL
We consider a wireless network consisting of a set of
resourcesB(the base stations or sectors) shared by a set
of network slicesO(the tenants). At a given point in time,
each slice supports a set of users (the customers or devices).
The wireless network is operated by an infrastructure provider
(hereafter the ‘infrastructure’). Each tenant is the owner of a
slice and requests resources for this slice to the infrastructure
provider. The network resources alocated to the slice are
then shared among the users of that slice (according to the
preferences expressed by the tenant of the slice).
A. Resource Alocation Model
As indicated in the introduction, we focus on a wel
established resource sharing model known in economics as
a Fisher market; we wil refer to this model as the ‘Share-
Constrained Proportional Alocation’ (SCPA) mechanism.
Hereafter, we refer to the set of users supported by the
network asU, which can be divided into subsetsUb(the users
at base stationb),Uo(the users of sliceo)andUob (theirintersection). For any useru∈U,weletb(u)denote the base
station it is currently associated with.
In our seting, each sliceois alocated a network shareso
(corresponding to its budget) such that o∈Oso=1.Theslice is at liberty in turn to distribute its share amongst its
users, assigning them weights (corresponding to the bids):wu
foru∈Uo, such that u∈Uowu=so. Weletwo=(wu:u∈Uo)be the weights of sliceo,w=(wu:u∈U)those
of al slices andw−o=(wu:u∈U\Uo)the weights of al
users excluding those of sliceo.
In this paper, we adopt a generic formulation for resources
that can be applied to a variety of technologies. The spe-
ciﬁc deﬁnition of resource wil depend on the underlying
technology; for instance, in LTE/LTE-A resources refer to
physical Resource Blocks, in FDM to bandwidth and in TDM
to the fraction of time. We shal assume users are alocated
a fraction of resources at their base station proportionaly to
their weightswu. Thus, the rate of useruis given by
ru(w)= wu
v∈Ub(u)wv
cu= wulb(u)(w)cu
wherelb(w)= u∈Ubwudenotes the overal load atbandcuis the user’s achievable rate, deﬁned as the rate that the user
would see if she had the entire base station to herself. Note
thatcudepends on the modulation and coding scheme selected
for the current radio conditions, which accounts for noise as
wel as the interference from the neighboring base stations.
Folowing similar analyses in the literature (see, e.g., [23]
and [25])), we shal assume thatcu is ﬁxed for each user
at a given time.
To implement the above resource alocation, a slice needs to
communicate the weights of its userswoto the infrastructure.
In turn, the infrastructure needs to communicate to the slice
the overal load at each base station, so that the slice can select
the weights of its users.1 We argue that this is a relatively light 
exchange of information; as a mater of fact, there are already 
some interfaces deﬁned in 3GPP, such as the X2 interface, 
which share this kind of information. Note that, by sharing 
information in this way, the weights of a given tenant are not 
disclosed to the others, but only the overal load at each base 
station.
Inthecasewhereasliceo is the only one with users at a 
given base station b, we shal assume that the slice’s users are 
alocated the entire capacity at that base station independent 
of their weights. Thus such a slice would set wu =0for 
these users, alowing them to receive al the resources of this 
base station without consuming any share. In order to avoid 
dealing with this special case, and without loss of generality, 
we wil make the folowing assumption for the rest of the 
paper.
Assumption 1 (Competition at Al Resources): We assume 
that al resources have active users from at least two slices.
B. Network Slice Utility and Service Diferentiation
Network slices may support services and customers of
diferent types and needs. Alternatively, competing slices with
similar customer types may wish to diferentiate the service
they provide. To that end, we assume each network slice has
aprivateutility that reﬂects the beneﬁt obtained by the slice
from a given alocation and is given by
Uo(w)=
u∈Uo
φufu(ru(w)), (1)
whereφuis the relative priority of useru, withφu≥0and
u∈Uoφu=1,andfu(·)is a utility function associated withthe user. In the sequel, we wil often focus on the folowing
wel-known class of utility functions [31]:
Deﬁnition 1: A network sliceohas a homogenousαo-fair
utility if for alu∈Uowe have that
fu(ru)=
⎧⎨
⎩
(ru)1−αo
(1−αo), αo=1
log(ru), αo=1.
With the above seting, a slice is free to choose diferent
fairness criteria in alocating resources across its users,
by selecting the appropriateαoparameter. Note thatαo=1
corresponds to the widely accepted proportional fairness cri-
terion, whileαo=2corresponds to potential delay fairness,
αo → ∞ to max-min fairness andαo =0to linear sum
utility.
Note that the chosen utility functionfu(ru)is concave, with
a concavity level that can be adjusted with theαoparameter.
Such a utility is appropriate to represent the behavior of elastic
trafﬁc, the performance of which mainly depends on rate
and exhibits diminishing utility improvements as throughput
increases [11].
C. Baseline Alocations
Next, we introduce some resource alocation comparative
baselines.
1Note that, even if the load was not communicated by the infrastructure,
a slice could infer it by varying its users’ weights and observing the resulting
resource alocations.
1) Socialy Optimal Alocations (SO):If slices were to share
their utility functions with a centralized authority, one could
in principle consider a socialy optimal alocation of weights
and resources. These would be given by the maximizer to the
overal network utilityU(w)given by (see [25]):
maxw≥0 U(w):=o∈O
soUo(w)
s.t.ru(w)= wulb(u)(w)cu,∀u∈U,
u∈Uo
wu=so,∀o∈O.
Note that (as in [25]) we have weighted the slices’ utilities to
reﬂect their shares (thus prioritizing those with higher shares).
We shal denote the resulting optimal weight and resource
alocations under the socialy optimal alocations byw∗and
r∗=(r∗u:u∈U), respectively.2) Static Slicing (SS):By static slicing (also known as static
spliting [32]) we refer to a complete partitioning of resources
based on the network sharesso,o∈O. In this seting, each
sliceoreceives a ﬁxed fractionsoof each resource and can
unilateraly optimize its weight alocation as folows:
maxw0≥0U
o(wo)=
u∈Uo
φufu(ru(wo))
s.t.ru(wo)= wu
v∈Uob(u)wv
socu ∀u∈Uo,
u∈Uo
wu=so,
where we have abused notation to indicate that, in this case,
Uoandrudepend only onwo.We shal denote the resulting
optimal weight and resource alocations under static slicing
for al slices bywssandrss=(rssu :u∈U)respectively,where
rssu = w
ssu
v∈Uob(u)wssv
socu ∀u∈Uo,∀o∈O. (2)
3) Optimal Dynamic Pricing:An alternative resource alo-
cation model to the one considered in Section II-A, where
slices have a ﬁxed budget, is to let slices bid for individual
base station resources and let the infrastructure provider set a
price to the slices. Under such a model, the payof obtained
by the slice is given byΠo=Uo−po,whereUois the utility
obtained by sliceowith the alocated resources, given by (1),
andpois the total price set to the slice for such resources.
A particularly interesting strategy within dynamic pricing is
the optimal dynamic pricing approach proposed in [8], which
sets the price for sliceoequal to the total utility loss caused
to the other slices, i.e.,po= o∈O\oUo,−o−Uo,where
Uo,−oandUoare the utility of sliceowith and without slice
oparticipating in the game, respectively. This strategy drives
the system to the social optimal (SO) alocation; thus, when
comparing the performance of our system against the SO in
Sections IV and V, the results also apply to the performance
atained by an optimal dynamic pricing approach.
While dynamic pricing may yield optimal system perfor-
mance, it also sufers from signiﬁcant drawbacks as compared
Fig. 1. Alocated resources for the three benchmark approaches.
to our model involving a ﬁxed budget: (i) to set the optimal
prices, the infrastructure provider needs to know the utility
function of al slices, which involves a signiﬁcant complexity
and overhead; and (ii) as argued in [33], for practical purposes
tenants typicaly prefer to deal with predictable pricing strate-
gies and costs driven by market considerations, rather than by
the instantaneous demands of the other tenants.
Figure 1 shows the alocation corresponding to each of the
above baseline alocations for a network with two base stations
and two slices with equal shares (s1=s2=0.5). We observe
that static slicing alocates one half of each base stations’
resources to each slice, independent of the number of users of
each slice, while the other two alocations take into account
the number of users of the slices at each base station.
III. NETWORKSLICINGGAME
Under the SCPA resource alocation model, it is reasonable
to assume that a player (network slice) would ‘strategicaly’
optimize the weight alocation of its users to maximize its own
utility (and thus the service delivered to its customers). In the
folowing, we analyze the game resulting from such a strategic
behavior.
A. Game Formulation
Since the resources alocated to a user depend on the weight
alocations of the other slices, the behavior of a slice wil be
predicated on the aggregate weight of the other slices at each
resource. From the point of view of sliceo, the overal load
at resourcebcan be decomposed as
lb(w)=aob(w−o)+dob(wo)
where
aob(w−o)=
o∈O\{o}u∈Uob
wu anddob(wo)=
u∈Uob
wu
correspond to the aggregate weight of the other slices and that
of sliceo, respectively. In our model, each slice is informed by
the infrastructure of the overal load at each base stationl=
(lb:b∈B); from this, the slice can obtainao=(aob:b∈B),by subtractingdobfrom thelbvalues. Then, based onao, it canchoose the weight setingwothat maximizes its utility. This
leads to the folowing game.
Deﬁnition 2: In the network slicing game, each sliceois
aware of the aggregated weight of the other slices at each base
station,ao=(aob:b∈B), and chooses the weight alocationwothat maximizes its utility.
B. Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium
Next we study whether there exists a Nash equilibrium (NE)
under which no slice can beneﬁt by unilateraly changing its
weight alocation. To that end, we ﬁrst characterize the best
response of a slice. Given the weights of the other slices,w−o,
the best response of sliceois the unique maximizerwoof its
utility, i.e.,
maxw o≥0 u∈Uo
φufu wucuaob(u)(w−o)+dob(u)(wo)
s.t
u∈Uo
wu=so.
The folowing lemma characterizes the best response for a
network slice with homogenousαo-fair utility (see [6] for the
best response whenαo=0).2
Lemma 1: Suppose sliceohas a homogeneousαo-fair
utility (withαo>0). Given the weights of the other slices
w−o>0, sliceo’s best responsewois the unique solution to
the folowing nonlinear set of equations:
wu=
βu (a
o
b(u)(w−o)
1αo
aob(u)(w−o)+dob(u)(wo)
2αo−1
v∈Uo
βv a
o
b(v)(w−o)
1αo
aob(v)(w−o)+dob(v)(wo)
2αo−1
so,∀u∈Uo, (3)
whereβu:= (φu)1αo(cu)1αo−1.
Note that sliceoneed only knowao(w−o)to compute
its best response. Building on this characterization, we wil
study the game in which al slices choose to alocate their
weights based on their best response. The folowing theorem
proves that this game admits a Nash equilibrium, i.e., there is
a weight alocationwsuch that no slice can improve its utility
by modifying its weights unilateraly.3
Theorem 1: Suppose al slices have homogenousαo-fair
utilities (with possibly diferentαo>0). Then, there exists
a (not necessarily unique) Nash equilibrium satisfying(3)for
each slice.
The above theorem covers any ﬁniteαovalue, but leaves out
the caseαo→ ∞, which yields a utility functionUo(w)=
minu∈Uo(ru(w))and corresponds to max-min fairness. The
folowing lemma shows that in this case the existence of a NE
is not guaranteed.
Lemma 2: LetUo(w)=minu∈Uo(ru(w))for two or more
slices. Then, the existence of a NE cannot be guaranteed.
C. Convergence of Best Response Dynamics
Below, we wil consider best response dynamics wherein
slices realize their best responses in rounds, either (i) updating
their weights (wo) sequentialy, one at a time and in the same
2The proofs of al lemmas and theorems are provided in the Appendix or
as supplementary material.
3The existence of a NE had already been proven by [5] for the caseαo=
0∀o. Here we extend this result to any combination ofαovalues.
TABLE I
IMPACT OF αo ON SLICE’S BEST RESPONSES
ﬁxed order, in response to the other slices’ weights (ao); or (ii)
having al slides update their weights simultaneously in each
round in response to the other slices’ weights in the previous
round.
Theorem 2: If slices have homogeneousαo-fair utilities,
possibly with diferentαo∈[1,2]foro∈O, then the best
response game converges to a Nash equilibrium. This result
holds both for sequential and for simultaneous updates.
Note that the value ofαoimpacts a slice’s best response
and consequently the game dynamics. As seen in Lemma 1,
the best response weights are proportional to:
wu∝g(aob,dob):= (a
ob)
1
αo
(aob+dob)
2
αo−1
,
where we have suppressed the dependency ofaobonw−oanddobonwo.The functiong(·,·)has diferent propertiesdepending onαowhichareshowninTableII.Theregime
where1≤αo≤2, considered in Theorem 2, is of particular
interest since it includes proportional (αo=1) and potential
delay (αo =2) fairness. It is known that convergence is
not ensured whenαo=0for al slices (see [6]); for other
regimes, we resort to the simulations results of Section V,
which suggest convergence for anyαo> 0since they are
diferent problems in nature and therefore the analysis require
a distinct approach.
Perhaps surprisingly, the above result is quite chalenging to
show. The key chalenge lies in the “price-anticipating” aspect
of the best response, in which players anticipate the impact of
their own alocation (indeed, as mentioned in the introduction,
there are very few results in the literature on the convergence
of price-anticipating best response dynamics).
IV. PERFORMANCEANALYSIS
In this section we analyze the performance of the Nash
equilibrium in terms of: (i)thegain over static slicing,which
is the benchmark alocation where resources are staticaly
partitioned, (ii)theprice of anarchy, which gives the loss
in overal utility resulting from slices’ strategic behavior, and
(iii)envy-freeness, which captures the degree to which a slice
would prefer another slice’s alocations across the network
resources. The ﬁrst result holds for any utility function, while
the other two assume that slice utilities are1-fair homogeneous
i.e.,Uo(w) = u∈Uoφulog(ru(w))∀o∈ O–awidelyaccepted case leading to the wel-known proportionaly fair
alocations.
A. Protection: Gain Over Static Slicing
We ﬁrst analyze if strategic behavior on the part of network
slices may result in alocations that are worse that those under
static slicing. Note that static slicing provides complete iso-
lation among slices but potentialy poor utilization. A critical
question is whether dynamic sharing, which achieves a higher
resource utilization, also provides the same level of protection.
This is conﬁrmed by the folowing result.
Lemma 3: Consider sliceoand any feasible weight alo-
cationw−o for other slices satisfying the network share
constraints. Then, there exists a weight alocationwofor slice
o, possibly dependent onw−o, such that the resulting weight
alocationwsatisﬁesru(w)≥rssu for alu∈Uo.The lemma is easily shown by choosingwosuch that
wu= w
ssu
u∈Uob(u)wssu
aob(u)(w−o)
b∈Boaob(w−o)
so,∀u∈Uo
whereBois the set of base stations where sliceohas users. The
intuitive interpretation for this choice is that by distributing
its weights proportionaly to the load at each base station,
sliceocan achieve the same resource alocation as static
slicing at each base station. Further, by redistributing these
alocations amongst its user in the same manner as static
slicing, it achieves at least as much rate per user.
It folows immediately from the above lemma that under
the SCPA resource alocation model, if al slices exhibit
strategic behavior atempting to maximize their utilities, they
necessarily achieve a higher utility than under static slicing.
This result does not require slices to have homogenous or
concave utilities, just that they be increasing in the users’ rate
alocations.
Theorem 3: If the game where each network slice max-
imizes its utility has a Nash equilibrium, then each slice
achieves a higher utility than under static slicing.
The above results guarantee aform of resource isolation,
since they show that (i) a slice can always choose a weight
assignment that provides its users with the same or higher
rates than those provided by static slicing (i.e., ful isolation),
and (ii) by choosing a smarter weight alocation, a slice is
guaranteed to experience beter performance than that achieved
with ful isolation.
B. Efﬁciency: Price of Anarchy
In the folowing, we analyze theprice of anarchyforαo=1
(i.e.,1-fair homogenousutilities). We deﬁne the price of
anarchy as the diference between theoveral network utility
resulting from the socialy optimal alocation,U(w∗),andthat
obtained at a Nash equilibrium of the SCPA resource alocation
mechanism,U(w); such a notion captures theefﬁciencyof the
proposed approach as it shows how far it performs from the
optimal.4
4Note that the price of anarchy is typicaly deﬁned as the ratio of the social
optimal network utility and the network utility under the NE. However, since
withαo=1we have logarithmic shaped utilities, the utility loss in this caseis beter expressed by the subtraction rather than by the ratio; as a mater of
fact, the ratio in linear scale coresponds to a subtraction in the logarithmic
scale.
The folowing result characterizes the socialy optimal alo-
cation of resources considered in the above deﬁnition for the
price of anarchy (see [34]).
Fact 1: For slices with 1-fair homogenous utilities,
the socialy optimal alocation of resourcesw∗is such that
w∗u=φuso,∀u∈Uoand∀o∈O.Building on the above result, the folowing theorem bounds
the price of anarchy – the proof is provided in the Appendix.
Theorem 4: If al slices have1-fair homogenous utilities,
then the Price of Anarchy (PoA) associated with a Nash
equilibriumwsatisﬁes
PoA:=U(w∗)−U(w)≤log(e).
Furthermore, there exists a game instance for which this bound
is tight.
Note that, with1-fair utilities, if we increase the capacity
of al resources by a factorΔc, we have a utility increase of
log(Δc). Thus, the performance improvement achieved by the
socialy optimal alocation over SCPA is (in the upper bound)
equivalent to having a capacityetimes larger, i.e., almost the
triple capacity. While there are some (pathological) cases in
which such a bound can be achieved, our simulation results
show that for practical scenarios the actual performance difer-
ence between the two alocations is much smaler, conﬁrming
that (forαo =1) the ﬂexibility gained with the SCPA
mechanism comes at a very smal price in performance.
C. Fairness: Envy-Freeness
Next we consider a Nash equilibrium w and analyze
whether a slice, sayo, with utilityUo(w),might have a beter
utility if it were to exchange its resources with those of another
slice, sayo. To that end, we denote by˜wthe resulting weight
alocation when the users of slicesoandoexchange their
alocated resources. It is easy to see thatw˜ois such that
w˜ou= φu
v∈Uobφv
dob(w)for alb∈Band alu∈Uob, (4)
i.e., sliceotakes the aggregate weight ofoat base stationb
under the Nash equilibrium,dob(w), and alocates it propor-tionaly to its user priorities. Clearly,˜wo is deﬁned similarly
and the remaining slices weights remain unchanged underw˜.
We deﬁne the envy of slice oforo’s resources under the
Nash equilibriumwby
Eo,o :=Uo(˜w)−Uo(w).
Note that envy is a “directed” concept, i.e., it is deﬁned from
sliceo’s point of view. WhenEo,o ≤0, we say sliceois not
envious. The folowing theorem provides a bound onEo,o.
Theorem 5: Consider a sliceowith1-fair homogeneous
utilities and the remaining slicesO\{o}with arbitrary slice
utilities. Consider a sliceosuch thatso=so.Letwdenote
a Nash equilibrium andw˜denote the resulting weights when
oandoexchange their resources. Then, the envy of sliceo
forosatisﬁes
Eo,o =Uo(˜w)−Uo(w)≤0.060.
Furthermore, there is a game instance where0.041≤Eo,o.
Given that, if one increases the rates of al users by a
factorΔrthis yields a utility increase oflog(Δr), one can
interpret this result as saying that, by exchanging resources
witho, sliceomay see a gain equivalent to increasing the
rate of al its users by a factor between 4.1% and 6.1% (given
by the lower and upper bounds of the above theorem). This
is quite low and, moreover, simulation results show that in
practical setings there is actualy (almost) never any envy,
conﬁrming that our system is (practicaly) envy-free.
V. PERFORMANCEEVA L UAT I O N
Next, we evaluate the performance of the SCPA resource
alocation mechanism via simulation. The mobile network
scenario considered is based on the IMT-A evaluation guide-
lines for dense ‘smal cel’ deployments [35], which consider
base stations with an intersite distance of 200 meters in a
hexagonal cel layout with 3 sector antennas and a network
size|B|of 57 sectors.5Unless otherwise stated, users move
according to the Random Waypoint Model (RWP) and user
association folows the strongest signal policy. The Signal
Interference to Noise Ratio of useru(SINRu) is computed
based on physical layer network model speciﬁed in [35]:
SINRu =Pbgub/( k∈B,k=bPkguk+σ2),wherePbis thetransmit power andgub denotes the channel gain between
useruand base stationb, which includes path loss, shadowing,
fast fading and antenna gain. Folowing [35], we setPb=
41dBm,σ2=−104dB, a path loss equal to36.7log10(dist)+22.7+26log10(fc)for carrier frequencyfc =2.5GHz,and an antenna gain of 17 dBi. The shadowing factor is
given by a log-normal function with a standard deviation
of 8dB (as in [36]) updated every second, and fast fading
folows a Rayleigh distribution dependent of the user speed
and the angle of incidence (as in [37]). Achievable rates
are then computed with the Shannon formula, BWlog2(1 +SINRu), for the averageSINRuand a channel bandwidth of
BW=10MHz [38]. Finaly, the modulation-coding scheme is
selected according to theSINRuthresholds reported in [39].
For al our simulation results, we obtained 95% conﬁdence
intervals with relative errors below 1% (not shown in the
ﬁgures).
Given the nature of elastic trafﬁc, the performance of which
mainly depends on rate, the evaluation conducted in this
section primarily focuses on this metric. However, we note that
as long as users are alocated a sufﬁciently high rate for the
trafﬁc they generate, a slice can ensure low delays and drop
rates for its users. This can be achieved, e.g., by acquiring
an appropriate shares0and/or performing proper admission
control on the users entering the slice.
A. Overal Performance
Throughout the paper we have usedstatic slicingand the
socialy optimalresource alocations as our baselines. In order
to conﬁrm our analytical results and gain additional insights,
we have evaluated the performance of the SCPA mechanism
5Note that, in this seting, users associate with sectors rather than the base
stations we used in the mechanism description and analysis.
Fig. 2. Average gain over static slicing and loss against social optimum for
diferent scenarios.
versus these two baselines via simulation. As an intuitive met-
ric for comparison, we have used the extra capacity required
by these baseline schemes to deliver the same performance
as SCPA: (i)Gain over SS:additional resources required by
static slicingto provide the same utility as SCPA (in %); and
(ii)Loss versus SO:additional resources required by SCPA
to provide the same utility as thesocialy optimalalocation
(in %). Note that the later metric is closely related to thePrice
of Anarchyanalyzed in Section IV-B;indeed, while the Price
of Anarchy reﬂects the loss of efﬁciency in terms of utility,
the Loss versus SO reﬂects the loss of efﬁciency in terms of
resources.
The results shown in Figure 2 are for diferent user den-
sities (|U|/|B|) and diferent slice utilities (αoparameter).
As expected, the SCPA mechanism always has a gain over
static slicing and a loss over the social optimal. However, for
αo=1the loss is wel below the bound given in Section IV-B.
We further observe that performance is particularly good as
long asαodoes not exceed 1 (Gain over SS up to 50%
and Loss over SO below 5%), and it degrades mildly asαo
increases.
B. Fairness
In addition to overal performance, it is of interest to
evaluate the fairness of the resulting alocations. While in
Section IV-C we derived analyticaly a bound on the envy,
we have further explored this via simulation by evaluating
up to107 randomly generated scenarios, with parameters
drawn uniformly in the ranges:|O| ∈[2,12],|B| ∈[10,90],
|U|/|B| ∈[3,15],αo∈[0.01,30]andφvectors in the simplex.
Our results show thatEo,o < 0holds foral the cases
explored, conﬁrming that in practice the system is envy-free.
C. Protection Against Other Slices
One of the main objectives of our proposed framework is to
enable slices to customize their resource alocations. This can
be done by adjusting (i) the user prioritiesφu,and(ii)the
parameterαo, which regulates the desired level of fairness
among the slice’s users. In order to evaluate the impact that
these setings have amongst slices, we simulated a scenario
with three slices: Slice1hasα1=1, Slice2hasα2=4,and
Slice3hasα3with varying values. For simplicity, we set the
prioritiesφuequal for al users.
Figure 3 shows the rate distributions of the3slices.
We observe that the choice ofα3is efective in adjusting the
level of user fairness for Slice 3; indeed, asα3grows, the rate
distribution becomes more homogeneous. Such customization
at Slice3has a higher impact on Slice1than on Slice 2. This
is the case because, asα2is quite large, the distribution of
Slice 2’s rates remains homogeneous, making the slice fairly
insensitive to the choices of the other slices. As can be seen in
the subplots, the utilities of Slices1and2are not only larger
than the utility of static slicing, but remain fairly insensitive
toα3, showing that in both cases we have a good level of
protection between slices.
D. Gains Over Static Slicing
In order to gain additional insight into the impact of the
various factors, Figure 4 displays the inﬂuence of the number
of slices (|O|) and the average load per base station sector
(|U|/|B|) on the gain over static slicing (given by the additional
resources in % required by static slicing to provide the same
performance as SCPA). The results show that the gains are
higher with a large number of slices and smal load. This
is rather intuitive: (i) if the slice has a large number of
users, its multiplexing gain isalready high without sharing
the infrastructure, and hence there is litle gain from sharing,
and (ii) if we have a smal number of slices, each of them
is already using a large fraction of the network resources and
the impact of sharing is smaler. It is also worth noting that
αohas a relatively smal impact on the gains.
E. File Download Times
To provide additional insights on the achieved gains from
an end-user perspective, we compare the ﬁle download times
achieved by SCPA against the static slicing baseline, when
base stations have the same capacity in both cases and users
download and endless sequence of ﬁles of ﬁxed size. Let
us deﬁne the ﬁle download time gain asGD =(DSS−
DSCPA)/DSS,whereDSSis the average ﬁle download time
with the static slicing approach andDSCPAwith the SCPA
approach. The gains achieved are shown in Figure 5 for a
ﬁle size of 20 Mb (results with other ﬁle sizes, not reported
here for space reasons, show a similar trend). We observe the
gains are substantial, and (as above) they are larger for low
user densities and a large number of slices.
F. Convergence Speed
The existence of a Nash equilibrium and the convergence of
Best Response Dynamics are essential for the system stability.
While the existence of a Nash equilibrium has been proven
for alαo values, convergence has only been shown for
αo∈[1,2]. In order to conﬁrm the convergence for otherαo
values, we have conducted extensive simulations implementing
sequential best response updates for up to107 randomly
Fig. 3. Impact ofα3decision on the slice rate distributions.
Fig. 4. Gains over static slicing for diferent setings.
Fig. 5. Gains in terms of ﬁle download times.
generated scenarios within the same parameter space as in
Section V-B. Our results conﬁrmed the convergence of the
best response game in al cases. Moreover, they also showed
that convergence speed mainly depends onαo, while it is
fairly insensitive to the user priorities and the network size.
According to the results, convergence is very quick forαo≤1
(about8rounds) and increases slightly asαogrows (about
16 rounds forαo =3). The average number of rounds
needed for the Best Response dynamics to converge are shown
in Figure 6.
Fig. 6. Average number of rounds until convergence for diferent scenarios.
Fig. 7. Gain over static slicing for diferent trafﬁc models andαvalues.
G. Impact of User Mobility
The above results assume a Random Waypoint mobility
model where users are (on average) uniformly distributed
across space. To understand the impact of other user distri-
butions, we evaluated theGain over SSfor the folowing
user mobility paterns: (i)uniform:al slices with a uni-
form spatial load distribution; (ii)overlapping hotspots:al
slices with the same non-uniform spatial load distribution;
(iii)non-overlapping hotspots:diferent slices with diferent
non-uniform spatial load distributions; and (iv) mixed: half 
of the slices with a uniform spatial load distribution and the 
other half with a non-uniform one. In al cases, we have 
4 slices with equal shares. The results, depicted in Figure 7, 
show that the gains are larger for scenarios with uneven and 
complementary trafﬁc loads; indeed, in this case diferent 
slices need their resources at diferent base stations and thus 
there is a higher gain from dynamicaly sharing the resources. 
We further observe that larger α values result in smaler gain; 
this is due to the fact that slices are less elastic with larger α, 
which limits the ability to exploit statistical multiplexing.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have analyzed a ‘share-constrained pro-
portional alocation’ framework for network slicing. The 
framework alows slices to customize the resource aloca-
tion to their users, leading to a network slicing game in 
which each slice reacts to the setings of the others. Our 
main conclusion is that the framework provides an efective 
and implementable scheme for dynamicaly sharing resources 
across slices. Indeed, this scheme involves simple operations at 
base stations and incurs a limited signaling between the slices 
and the infrastructure. Our results conﬁrm system stability 
(best response dynamics converge), substantial gains over 
static slicing, and fairness of the alocations (envy-freeness). 
Moreover, as long as the majority of the slices do not choose 
αo values larger than 1 (i.e., they do not al demand very 
homogeneous rate distributions), the overal performance is 
close to optimal (price of anarchy is very smal). Thus, in this 
case the ﬂexibility provided by this framework comes at no 
cost. If a substantial number of slices choose higher αo’s, then 
we pay a (smal) price for enabling slice customization.
APPENDIX
In the folowing, we give the proofs of Lemma 3 and 
Theorems 3, 4 and 5. The proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 and 
Theorems 1 and 2 have been provided as supplementary 
material.
Proof of Lemma 3
Given the weight alocation under static slicing, wss,and 
the weights of the other slices under dynamic sharing, w−o, 
we consider the folowing weight alocation for slice o:
wu= w
ssu
u∈Uob(u)wssu
aob(u)(w−o)
b∈Boaob(w−o)
so, (5)
where Bo is the set of base stations where sliceohas
customers.
We deﬁneρou(wss)as the ratio between the weight of useruunder static slicing and the sum of the weights of al the
users of the same slice in the base station, i.e.,
ρou(wss).= w
ssu
u∈Uob(u)wssu
where we have dropped the terms w−o andwss from
aob(u)(w−o)andρou(wss)for readability purposes.
With the alocation given by (5), for two usersuanduof
sliceoit holds
wu
wu =
ρou
ρou
aob(u)
aob(u)
(6)
Furthermore, it also holds that
dob=
u∈Uob
wu=
u∈Uob
ρou
aob(u)
b∈Bo
aobso=
aob(u)
b∈Bo
aobso=
wu
ρou
foru∈Uob.From the above expression, we have
ρoulb(u)(w)
ρoulb(u)(w)=
ρou aob(u)+dob(u)
ρou aob(u)+dob(u)
=
ρou aob(u)+wuρou
ρou aob(u)+wuρou
,
and combining this with (6):
ρoulb(u)(w)
ρoulb(u)(w)=
ρou aob(u)+ a
o
b(u)
aob(u )
wuρou
ρou aob(u)+wuρou
=
ρouaob(u) 1+ wuaob(u )ρou
ρouaob(u) 1+ wuaob(u )ρou
= ρ
ouaob(u)
ρouaob(u)
From the above,
wu= wu
u∈Uowuso=
so
u∈Uo
wuwu
= so
u∈Uo
ρou aob(u )
ρouaob(u)
= so
u∈Uo
ρou lb(u )(w)ρoulb(u)(w)
= ρ
oulb(u)(w)
u∈Uoρoulb(u)(w)so=
ρoulb(u)(w)
b∈Bolb(w)
so
SinceBo⊆B:
b∈Bo
lb(w)≤
b∈B
lb(w)=1
and thus
wu≥ρoulb(u)(w)so,
from which
ru(w)= wulb(u)(w)cu≥
ρoulb(u)(w)so
lb(u)(w) cu=ρ
ousocu=rssu.
The above holds for al u ∈ U, which proves the
lemma.
Proof of Theorem 3
This result folows from Lemma 3. Given the conﬁguration
of the other slices, there exists a conﬁguration for a given slice
under which al its users obtain at least the same throughput
as with static slicing, and thus the slice’s utility with this
conﬁguration is at least as high. As a consequence, in a NE
the slice wil receive a utility no smaler than this value.
Proof of Theorem 4
We ﬁrst show that an optimal (not necessarily unique)
solution to the centralized problem is given byw∗which
assigns weights to al users of a given slice proportionaly
to their priorities, i.e.,w∗u=φuso,∀u∈Uo. To prove this weonly need to show thatU(w∗)≥U(w)for any other feasible
weight vectorw. To that end, consider
U(w∗)−U(w)=
o∈Ou∈Uo
φu log w
∗ucu
lb(w∗)−log
wucu
lb(w)
Let us denote the distributions induced byw∗ andw
respectively as:pb(w) =(pbu(w) = wulb(w):u∈Ub)andpb(w∗) =(pbu(w∗) = wulb(w∗):u∈Ub).Sinceφ= w∗,we have
U(w∗)−U(w)=
b∈B
lb(w∗)
o∈Ou∈Ubo
pbu(w∗)logp
bu(w∗)
pbu(w)
=
b∈B
lb(w∗)D(pb(w∗)|pb(w))
where D(pb(w∗)|pb(w))is the Kulback-Leibler diver-
gence, between the distributions induced byw∗ andw
respectively, i.e.,pb(w∗)andpb(w). It is known [40] that
D(pb(w∗)|pb(w))≥0and0only whenpb(w)=pb(w∗)
Hence it folows thatw∗is optimal.
We next show that U(w∗)−U(w)≤log(e)holds when
wis a Nash Equilibrium of the distributed resource alocation
game andw∗an optimal solution. To show this, we proceed as
folows. Since in the Nash Equilibrium each slice maximizes
its utility given the alocation of the other slices,
u∈Uo
φulog wulb(u)(w)≥u∈Uo
φulog w
∗u
dob(u)(w∗)+aob(u)(w)
Given thatdob(u)(w∗)+aob(u)(w)≤lb(u)(w)+lb(u)(w∗),
u∈Uo
φulog wulb(u)(w)≥u∈Uo
φulog w
∗u
lb(u)(w)+lb(u)(w∗)
From the above it folows that
u∈Uo
φulog(ru(w∗))−
u∈Uo
φulog(ru(w))
≤
u∈Uo
φulog w
∗ucu
lb(u)(w∗)
−
u∈Uo
φulog w
∗ucu
lb(u)(w)+lb(u)(w∗)
=−
u∈Uo
φulog lb(u)(w
∗)
lb(u)(w)+lb(u)(w∗)
Summing the above over al slices weighted by the corre-
sponding shares yields
U(w∗)−U(w)≤−
u∈U
φusolog lb(u)(w
∗)
lb(u)(w)+lb(u)(w∗)
Givenw∗u=φuso,wehave
U(w∗)−U(w)
≤−
b∈B
log lb(w
∗)
lb(w)+lb(w∗)
u∈Ubw
∗
u
=−
b∈Bu∈Ub
wulog lb(w
∗)
lb(w)+lb(w∗)
v∈Ubw
∗v
v∈Ubwv
=−
b∈Bu∈Ub
wulog lb(w
∗)/lb(w)
1+lb(w∗)/lb(w)
lb(w∗)lb(w)
and, given that(x/(1 +x))x>1/eforx≥0, this yields
U(w∗)−U(w)≤
b∈Bu∈Ub
wulog(e)=log(e).
Finaly, we show that there exists some scenario for which
U(w∗)−U(w) = log(e). Let us consider a scenario with two
slices with sharess1ands2, respectively. There are two base
stations. Slice1hasm+1users,massociated to base station
1and one associated to base station 2. Slice2has one user
associated to base station 2. Al users havecub=1. Under
the optimal alocation:
U(w∗)= s1m+1mlog
1
m +
s1
m+1log
s1m+1
s1(m+1) +s2
+s2log s2s1(m+1)+s2
,
and under the Nash equilibrium
U(w)= s1m+1mlog
1
m +
s1
m+1log
s1
s1+s2
+s2log s2s1+s2 .
Form→∞ this yieldsU(w∗)=s1log1m +s2log(1)and
U(w)=s1log1m +s2log s2s1+s2 .Fromthis,
U(w)−U(w∗)=s2log s2s1+s2
which tends to−log(e)whens1→1ands2→0.
Proof of Theorem 5
Let us consider two slices,oando, that have the same
shareso. Let the utility function of sliceobeUo =
u∈Uoφulog(ru). We ﬁrst show that it holds
Uo(˜wo)−Uo(wo)≤0.060
In order to bound the envyUo(˜w)−Uo(w)at the
NE, we wil construct a weight alocationm that satisﬁes
Uo(m)≤Uo(w)andUo(˜m)≥Uo(˜w)–wherew˜andm˜
are the alocations resulting from exchanging the resources of
slicesoandoinwandm, respectively. It then folows that
Uo(˜m)−Uo(m)is an upper bound on the envy.
Speciﬁcaly, the weight alocationm wil be chosen such
that: (i) for al slices diferent fromo, the weights remain the
same as in the NE, i.e, m−o = w−o;and(ii) the weights 
of slice o are chosen so as to maximize Uo(m) subject to
dob(mo) = u∈Uobmu ≤ aob(m−o)∀b∈Band slice o’sshare constraint. Note that with this weight alocation we have
aob(u)(m−o)=aob(u)(w−o)– for readability purposes, we wiluse justaob(u). Note also that the weights that sliceowouldhave with the resources oforemain the same, i.e.m˜o=w˜o.
By folowing a similar argument to that of Lemma 2, it can
be seen that the above leads to the weightsmuforu∈Uo
solving the set of equations below, which have a feasible
solution as long asso< u∈Uoaob(u)(m−o)(we deal withthe case b∈Boaob<solater).
mu=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
aob(u) φuv∈Uob(u)φv
, aob(u)=dob(u)(mo)
φu a
o
b(u)
aob(u)+dob(u)(mo)
v∈Uˆo
φv a
o
b(v)
aob(v)+dob(v)(mo)
so, aob(u)>dob(u)(mo)
where Uˆo is the set of users of sliceo for which
aob(u)>dob(u)(mo)andso=so− u∈Uo\ˆUomu.It is clear that with this weight alocation we haveUo(m)≤
Uo(w). Indeed, only the weights of sliceohave changed and
(as mentioned before)wois the best response of the sliceo,
hence any other weight seting for this slice wil provide a
lower utility.
To showUo(˜m)≥Uo(˜w)we proceed as folows. The base
stations that initialy had a load for operatorolarger thanaob(dob(u)(mo)>aob) decrease their load with the new alocation,while the others increase it. Let us denote the ﬁrst set of base
stations asB1and the other set asB2. Since the base stations
of setB1decrease their load in the new alocation and the
base stations of setB2increase it, we can move from the
initial alocation to the new one by iteratively selecting one
base station of setB1and one of setB2and moving load
from the ﬁrst one to the second until one of them reaches its
target load. When decreasing the load of base stationband
increasing that of base stationbbyδwe have
dUo(˜w)
dδ =−
u∈Uob
φu
lb(˜w)+
u∈Uob
φu
lb(˜w)
If we can show at the beginning (before increasing/decreasing
the load of any base station), for anyb∈B1andb∈B2it
holds
u∈Uob
φu
lb(˜w)≥
u∈Uob
φu
lb(˜w) (7)
we wil have the value of u∈Uob φulb for any base stationof setB1wil always be larger than for any base station of
setB2, since it are larger at the beginning and it increases in
the intermediate steps, whileit decreases for a base station
ofB2. With this,dUo(˜m)/dδis positive at the beginning and
wil continue to be positive in the intermediate steps, yielding
to an increase indUo(˜m).
To show (7), we proceed as folows. It holds that
dob(mo)
dob =
u∈Uobφu
u∈Uob φu
1
1+dob(mo)/aob
1
1+dob(mo)/aob
= u∈Uobφu
u∈Uob φu
⎛
⎝1+
dob(mo)aob
1+dob(mo)aob
⎞
⎠
Forb∈ B1 andb ∈ B2 (sinceaob < dob(mo)andaob>dob(mo))
dob(mo)
dob(mo)<
u∈Uobφu
u∈Uob φu
and thus
lb
u∈Uobφu
=a
ob+dob(mo)
u∈Uobφu
< 2d
ob(mo)
u∈Uobφu
< 2d
ob(mo)
u∈Uob φu
≤a
ob+dob(mo)
u∈Uob φu
= lb
u∈Uob φu
which proves (7), and thusUo(˜m)≥Uo(˜w).
We now go back to the case b∈Boaob<so. Folowing theabove procedure, in this case we can ﬁnd an alocationmo
that satisﬁes: (i)Uo(m)≤Uo(w),(ii)Uo(˜m)≥Uo(˜w)and
(iii)dob(mo)≥aob∀b. In this case we then haveUo(˜w)−Uo(w)≤Uo(˜m)−Uo(m)≤0.
To ﬁnd an upper bound onUo(˜m)−Uo(m), recal that
Uo(˜m)=
u∈Uo
φulog m˜uculb(˜m),
and
Uo(m)=
u∈Uo
φulog muculb(m).
Given thatlb(˜m)=lb(m)andm˜u=muforu/∈Uˆo,this
yields
Uo(˜m)−Uo(m)=
u∈Uˆo
φulog( ˜mu)−
u∈Uˆo
φulog(mu).
Since u∈Uˆolog( ˜mu)subject to u∈Uˆom˜u=sotakes a
maximum atm˜u=φˆuso(whereˆφu=φu/ v∈Uˆoφv),
Uo(˜m)−Uo(m)≤
u∈Uˆo
φulog(ˆφuso)−
u∈Uˆo
φulog(mu)
≤
u∈Uˆo
φˆulog(ˆφuso)−
u∈Uˆo
φˆulog(mu)
(8)
In order to bound the term u∈Uˆoφˆulog(mu)above,we look for a bound onmumv. Given thataob≥dob(mo)holdsfor alb,wehaveforu, v∈Uˆo:
mu
mv=
φu
φv
aob(u)
aob(u)+dob(u)(mo)
aob(v)
aob(v)+dob(v)(mo)
>φuφv
aob(u)
aob(u)+aob(u)
aob(v)
aob(v)
=12
φˆu
φˆv.
It can be seen that u∈Uˆoφˆulog(mu)subject tomumv ≥
1
2
φˆu
φˆv and u∈Uˆoφˆu =1 is maximized when themuφˆu of
al users but one is equal to the lower bound given by the
constraint, which yields
mu
φˆu =
1
2
mv
φˆv,∀u=v. (9)
This is shown by contradiction. Let us imagine that in the
weight alocation that maximizes (8) there exists some other
userufor whichmuφˆu > mv2ˆφv,wherevis the user with thelargestmv/ˆφvof that alocation. Then, if we increasemvby
δand decreasemubyδwe have
d
dδu∈Uo
φˆulog φˆusomu =−
φˆv
mv+
φˆu
mu>0
and thus (8) increases, which contradicts our assumption that
(8) was already maximum. From (9) we have
mu= φˆuso
u∈Uo\{v}
φˆu+2φˆv,andmv=
2ˆφvso
u∈Uo\{v}
φˆu+2φˆv
Combining this with (8) we obtain
Uo(˜w∗o)−Uo(w∗o)≤
u∈Uo\{v}
φˆulog
⎛
⎝
u∈Uo\{v}
φˆu+2φˆv
⎞
⎠
+φˆvlog
⎛
⎝12u∈Uo\{v}
φˆu+2φˆv
⎞
⎠
= log(1 +φˆv)+ˆφvlog(1/2)
If we now compute theˆφvthat maximizes this expression
we obtainφˆv= 1log 2−1, and substituting this value
Uo(˜w∗o)−Uo(w∗o)≤−log(log 2)− 1log 2−1 log 2
As mentioned at the beginning, the above bounds also applies
toUo(˜wo)−Uo(wo).
We next show that the worst case envy is lower bounded
by 0.041, by ﬁnding a game instance for whichUo(˜wo)−
Uo(wo) =0.041. Let us consider a scenario with2base
stations. Let sliceohave a share ofsoand one user at each
base station with prioritiesφ1andφ2. Let the loads of the other
slices in these two base stations bea1=1−so−xφ2soand
a2=xφ2so.foraﬁxedx>0.Letsobe sufﬁciently smal
such thata1>φ2so.
In this seting, the weights of sliceoat each station are
given by
d11=
soφ1 a1a1+d11
φ1 a1a1+d11 +φ2 a2a2+d12
,andd12=
soφ2 a2a2+d12
φ1 a1a1+d11 +φ2 a2a2+d12
We distinguish the cases (i)x≥1and (ii)x<1.
(i)Forx≥1, we consider sliceowith shareso =sowith
prioritiesφ˜1andφ˜2,where
φ˜1
φ˜2=
φ1
φ2
a2−φ2 so+d12a2+d12
a1−φ1 so+d11a1+d11
We further consider a third slice with only one user in the ﬁrst
base station withs3=a1−φ1soand a fourth slice with a
one user in the second base station withs4=a2−φ2so.This
leads tod21=φ1soandd22=φ2so.If we now letso→0,
d12= φ2xφ2soφ1(xφ2so+d12)+φ2xφ2soso=φ2
xφ2so
xφ2so+d12so
From the above,d12 = xˆφ2 so,whereˆxis the uniquesolution to the equationx=(x+ˆx)ˆx. Then,d11=so−xˆφ2so.From this, we have that in this case
Uo(˜w)−Uo(w)=φ1log φ1soso−xˆφ2so +φ2log
φ2so
xˆφ2so
=φ1log φ11−xˆ+ˆxφ1 −(1−φ1)log(ˆx)
(ii) In case thatx<1, we consider sliceohas priorities
φ˜1andφ˜2,where
φ˜1
φ˜2=
φ1
φ2
a2−xφ2 so+w2a2+w2
a1−so−xφ2 so+w1a1+w1
which leads to w˜1 =(1−xφ2)so andw˜2 = xφ2 so.
We further consider a third slice in the ﬁrst base station with
s3=a1−(1−xφ2)so.Ifwenowletso→ 0,wehavethe
same expressions as above forw1andw2, from which
Uo(˜wo)−Uo(wo)
=φ1log so−xφ2soso−xˆφ2so +φ2log
xφ2so
xˆφ2so
=φ1log 1−x+xφ11−xˆ+ˆxφ1 −(1−φ1)log
x
xˆ
By puting together the casesx≥1andx<1, we can
obtain a lower bound for the worst-case envy by ﬁnding the
values ofxandφ1overx>0andφ1∈[0,1]that minimize
the folowing expression⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
φ1log φ11−xˆ+ˆxφ1 −(1−φ1) log(ˆx), forx≥1
φ1log 1−x+xφ11−xˆ+ˆxφ1 −(1−φ1)log
x
xˆ ,forx<1
By performing the above search numericaly, we ﬁnd a
scenario with the folowing envy level:
Uo(˜wo)−Uo(wo)=0.041
which terminates the proof of the theorem.
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